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WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK RESPOND TO Gertz
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts have had difficulty reconciling the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press' with the
legitimate interest of the individual in protecting his reputation
from defamatory falsehoods.' Since 1964 the United States Su-
preme Court has struggled to balance these two apparently con-
tradictory values. After a long line of cases the Court determined
that, in at least one area of defamation law, the development of
a standard of liability should be left to the individual states.
Thus, the Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 left the
states scrambling to promulgate constitutionally permissible
standards for imposing liability upon publishers and broadcasters
of defamatory falsehoods concerning private individuals involved
in matters of public interest or general concern.
The Gertz decision presents inherent problems to the states.
In effect, it requires that the courts of each state decide for state
citizens the protection to be given their reputations. In balancing
the interest of an individual in his reputation against the equally
significant interest of the public in matters of interest to them,
the states will undoubtedly adopt different standards.4 Two re-
cent state court decisions in New York and Washington are evi-
dence of the widely disparate standards which are inevitable.
In Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co.,I the Washington Su-
preme Court held that a publisher of a defamatory falsehood
concerning a private individual involved in a matter of general or
public interest is liable for actual damages if he fails to exercise
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 This legitimate interest has been consistently recognized even while being limited
by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
This lack of uniformity poses serious problems for the interstate publisher. To avoid
liability publishers must be aware of the standards set by each state. Publishers are, in
effect, bound by the states which impose the highest duty of due care on publishers. For
discussions of this problem and of the possibility of media self-censorship as a result of
this lack of uniformity, see Comment, State Court Reactions to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.: Inconsistent Results and Reasoning, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1431, 1445-46 (1976); Note,
New Standards in Media Defamation Cases: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 12 CALIF. W.L.
REV. 172, 186-88 (1975).
1 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
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reasonable care.' The New York Court of Appeals, ruling on the
same issue, held, in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,
Inc.,7 that the relevant question in imposing liability in these
cases is whether the publisher acted in a "grossly irresponsible
manner without due consideration for the standards of informa-
tion gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsi-
ble parties."8 This comment will analyze the two standards pro-
mulgated by the highest courts of Washington and New York and
discuss which of these standards best serves the dual values of
freedom of speech and press and protection of reputation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Because the common law tort of defamation results in the
imposition of strict liability, it has long been a source of conster-
nation to commentators.' Upon a finding that the statement of
publication was false, defamatory, and communicated to a third
party, damages were presumed. Thus, liability was imposed ab-
sent a finding of fault."0 Historically, any contradictions between
the twin torts of libel and slander and the constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and press were dismissed with the blan-
ket assertion that defamatory falsehoods were not protected
under the first amendment." Thus, the interest of the individual
in his reputation was always superior to the public interest and
"right to know." It was not until 1964 that the conflict was recog-
nized.
A. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan 2 through Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.'
3
In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court first
Id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 85.
7 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
See, e.g., Harum, Remolding of Common Law Defamation, 49 A.B.A.J. 149 (1963);
Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1073 (1962).
Interestingly, even in Great Britain, known for its vigorous defamation law, some
commentators feel that strict liability in defamation should be limited with respect to the
news media. Report of the Committee on Defamation, 39 MOD. L. REV. 187 (1975).
IC See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRs § 113 (4th ed. 1971).
" See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87
(1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"3 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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confronted the question of whether the first amendment necessi-
tated a limitation of state libel law in certain instances. One of
three elected commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought suit against the New York Times for alleged defamatory
falsehoods published in a paid advertisement deploring the ill-
treatment of civil rights workers in the South. The Court held
that, in cases involving the alleged defamation of a public official,
recovery must be based upon a showing of "actual malice" de-
fined as "knowledge that . . . [the statement] was false or . . .
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'"
Although limited to defamation involving public officials,
New York Times was a radical departure from the "defamatory
falsehoods are not protected free speech" theory. In rapid succes-
sion, the Court, in what is universally referred to as the "Times
progeny," expanded the application of this "knowledge of falsity
or reckess disregard of truth" standard to criminal libel, 5 supervi-
sors of county-owned recreational facilities," candidates for pub-
lic office, 7 and police officers. 8 In addition, the rule was extended
to cover such "public figures" as a college football coach accused
of "fixing" a game" and a retired army general involved in a
campus disturbance.0 "Reckless disregard of truth" was defined,
in yet another case, as "serious doubts as to the truth of...
[the] publication."'" However, the Court was soon to move away
abruptly from its "public official" and "public figure" rationale
in deciding defamation cases.
" The Court noted that the case was to be considered "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376 U.S. at
270. The Court concluded:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
IS Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
" Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
SOcala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265 (1971).
" Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
SI St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,22 the Court decided the
question of whether the first amendment limited the right of a
private individual to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
involving a matter of public or general interest. Rosenbloom, a
Philadelphia book dealer, complained that broadcasts by Metro-
media, which referred to his books as "obscene" and stated that
a pending federal suit was an attempt on his part to force the
police to "lay off the smut racket," were defamatory.
23
Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, stated that the relevant
question in determining whether to require the New York Times
standard of "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth"
was not the status of the plaintiff as either public official, public
figure, or private individual, but the nature of the subject matter
involved in the alleged defamatory statement.2' Thus, if the event
reported was one of public or general interest, a private individual
could recover damages for libel "only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. '25 The effect was, therefore, to extend the standard
to private individuals by changing the emphasis from the status
of the defamed person to the character of the event reported.
The Times progeny, culminating in Rosenbloom, seemed to
indicate a clear trend in the law of defamation as affected by the
first amendment. In virtually all cases, the liability of a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory statements was to be based only
upon a finding of actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of truth since the "public interest" is implicit in nearly every-
thing the media reports. Given the fact that "reckless disregard"
required "serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, '26 the
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 36.
24 The Court said:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because
in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become in-
volved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on
the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
390 U.S. at 731.
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obstacles in the way of recovery by a defamed individual seemed
insurmountable.
B. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.27
Rosenbloom, however, was a plurality opinion. Dissents by
Justices Harlan and Marshall in that case indicated marked dis-
content with the application of the New York Times standard to
defamation of private individuals. With Gertz the Court re-
treated from its position in Rosenbloom and placed upon the
states the burden of determining what standard to adopt, so long
as it was not strict liability, in allowing recovery from defamers
of private individuals.
Much has been written of Gertz and its predicted effect upon
state defamation law.28 In that case, an attorney brought suit in
libel against the publisher of the magazine American Opinion. In
an article discussing a supposed communist conspiracy to dis-
credit the police, Gertz was referred to as a "communist-fronter,"
and a "Leninist," and was accused of having a criminal record.
2
1
Framing the issue as whether publishers and broadcasters of de-
famatory falsehoods involving private individuals enjoy a consti-
tutional privilege against liability, the Court returned to the tra-
ditional inquiry of the New York Times progeny. The Court again
focused on the type of person defamed, not the event involved.
Recognizing the conflicting values in the case, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, said: "Some tension necessarily exists
between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the
legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.""0 The Court,
however, declined to shoulder the responsibility of drawing the
line of demarcation between the two interests and instead left the
ultimate decision to the individual states: "We hold that, so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law-Damages for Libel-A New Standard for
Recovery of Damages by Private Individuals Libeled in a Report of Public Interest-
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 1 B.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (1975); Note, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 89 (1975);
Comment, As Time Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Its Effect On California
Defamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv.
1349 (1975); Note, Freedom to Defame, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 166 (1975).
418 U.S. at 326.
Id. at 342.
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publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual."'" However, this license given to'the states
carried another limitation: "[T]he State may not permit recov-
ery of presumed damages, at least when liability is not based on
a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. '32 Therefore, provided they did not impose strict liability
or grant presumed damages in the absence of New York Times
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth," the states
were, and indeed are, at liberty to set their own standards of care
in imposing liability upon defamers of private individuals. 
3
II. Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co.
3 4
In Taskett, the Supreme Court of the state of Washington
took advantage of the Gertz invitation to promulgate a liability
standard in the area of private defamation.
A. The Background of the Decision
On January 11, 1973, KING television broadcast a news story
concerning the supposed disappearance of William Taskett, a
Seattle advertising executive who owned ninety-five percent of an
agency incorporated under the name Bill Taskett & Associates,
Inc. During the previous month, the agency had lost one of its
major accounts, and, threatened with lawsuits, Taskett filed for
statutory dissolution of the corporation. Upon the appointment
of a trustee and the notification of all creditors, including defen-
dant KING Broadcasting, Taskett and his wife departed for a
vacation in Mexico. The story broadcast by defendant asserted
that "[s]everal Seattle businesses, including some television and
" Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
= In a more recent case, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court
indirectly limited the definition of "public figure" by refusing to apply the label to the
wife of the scion of a wealthy industrial family. The Court further declined to extend the
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" test of New York Times to all media
coverage of judicial proceedings. This would seem to confirm the Court's unwillingness to
extend the New York Times doctrine on the basis of the nature of the event involved, in
this case the divorce of two extremely wealthy people. The relevant inquiry is whether the
person allegedly defamed is a public official, public figure, or a private individual, and in
this context the Court will apply the "public figure" classification strictly.
86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (remanding to trial court). On remand, the
trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. No appeal was
taken from that decision. Telephone interview with Evan L. Schwab, attorney for KING
Broadcasting Co. (June 28, 1977).
1978
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radio stations, are looking for an advertising man. He's gone and
he may have some of their money." 5 The story then went on to
state that "no one knows where he is"; quoted the "receiver" as
saying that the firm's debts might total one hundred thousand
dollars while assets were a fraction of that amount; indicated the
amounts several advertisers were alleged to have lost when Tas-
kett left; noted that Taskett was last heard of in Mexico; and
ended with the plea, "Bill Taskett, won't you please come
home.'13'
The story was investigated for the defendant by a reporter
who had spoken with the sublessee of Taskett's apartment, with
various creditors, and with the trustee, and had consulted court
files relating to suits pending against Taskett. Upon returning to
Seattle, Taskett brought suit in libel against KING Broadcasting
and James Harriot, the station's "anchorman."
Washington had been one of the first states to respond to
Rosenbloom. In Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 37 the state su-
preme court, citing Rosenbloom with approval, and noting the
"tension" between the individual's interest in his reputation and
first amendment guarantees, determined that a private individ-
ual involved in a matter of public interest must prove "knowing
or reckless falsity" with clear and convincing proof to recover in
libel.38 Relying on Miller, the trial court in Taskett granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of KING. The court noted that Gertz
appeared to allow more "flexibility" than Rosenbloom in impos-
ing liability but said that any change would have to be initiated
in the state supreme court.39 Taskett appealed, and the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals certified the case to the Washington Su-
preme Court.
Although the state supreme court had not addressed the is-
sues raised in Gertz before the Taskett case, the state's judiciary
was aware of Gertz and its potential impact upon Miller. The
Quotes are as reported in the court's opinion. 86 Wash. 2d at 451, 546 P.2d at 88.
31 Quotes are as reported in the court's opinion. Id. at 452, 546 P.2d at 88-89.
31 79 Wash. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971).
u Id. at 827, 490 P.2d at 109.
Brief for Appellant at 6 (quoting from trial court's oral opinion). Brief for Respon-
dents at 23 indicates that plaintiff did not mention the Gertz decision in his brief opposing
summary judgment. He did not ask the trial court to read or apply any rule under Gertz,
nor did he respond to the court's offer to defer final decision until it had read the Gertz
opinion in full.
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Washington Court of Appeals, in Exner v. AMA,40 a case involv-
ing an alleged defamation of a self-proclaimed public figure with
respect to the limited issue of fluoridation of water, observed, in
dicta: "[pirivate individuals who have not become public figures
may now protect their reputations in state courts by legal remedy
without proof of malice and ... the mandate of Miller v. Argus
Publishing is likewise modified."'"
Against the background of Gertz (which allowed greater lee-
way in imposing liability upon defamers of private individuals),
Miller (which was still the law of the state requiring "knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" for recovery), and the
incorrect conclusion made in Exner (that Gertz required a modifi-
cation of the strict standard in Miller), the court proceeded to
clarify the law of defamation in Washington.
B. The Holding
Recognizing the problem of reconciling first amendment
guarantees and defamation law, as discusssed in earlier Washing-
ton cases, 2 the Washington court agreed with the reasoning in
Gertz. Hence, to require "knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard of truth" as a prerequisite to recovery in libel by a private
individual imposed an unacceptable burden resulting in near-
absolute immunity for the media. The court further reasoned that
the argument that a lesser standard than the New York Times
test might result in "self-censorship" was "without merit."4
Thus, the underlying rationale of both Rosenbloom and Miller
was undercut. Although the day of strict liability for defamatory
falsehoods had passed, the pendulum had seemingly swung too
far in favor of the media. Balancing the competing interests, the
court arrived at the following conclusion:
[W]e hold that a private individual, who is neither a public figure
nor official, may recover actual damages for a defamatory falsehood,
concerning a subject of general or public interest, where the sub-
stance makes substantial dangers to reputation apparent, on a
showing that in publishing the statement, the defendant knew or,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the state-
" 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).
' Id. at 223, 529 P.2d at 869.
42 See, e.g., Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969);
Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967).
,3 86 Wash. 2d at 446, 546 P.2d at 86.
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ment was false, or would create a false impression in some material
respect."
The court then specifically overruled Miller v. Argus Publishing
Co. and reversed and remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion.45
III. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.'"
Chapadeau offered the state of New York its opportunity to
respond to Gertz. The New York judiciary had adopted, as had
Washington, the New York Times-Rosenbloom standard and had
frequently applied it.'7 Also, as had Washington, a lower New
York court had indicated in dicta that, in light of Gertz, a stan-
dard different from that adopted in accordance with Rosenbloom
might better serve to balance the conflicting public and private
interests in defamation law.'
A. The Background of the Decision
On June 10, 1971, Joseph L. Chapadeau, a public school
teacher, was arrested and charged with criminal possession of
heroin and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument.
These charges were subsequently dropped. In reporting the event,
the defendant, a local newspaper in Utica, New York, grouped the
story of Chapadeau's arrest with a report concerning the arrests
of two other men on charges of criminal possession of marijuana.
The alleged libel involved one paragraph of the article which
" id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 85. Childress v. Hearst Corp., 86 Wash. 2d 486, 546 P.2d
108 (1976), decided the same day on similar facts, cited the Taskett rule as controlling.
0 See note 34 supra. One justice, concurring with the new rule, nevertheless, dis-
sented on the ground that the rule should not be applied retroactively. Another justice
lodged a vigorous dissent opposing the new rule and defending Miller.
46 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
1 See Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 298 N.E.2d 52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863
(1973); Twenty-Five E. 40th Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 595, 282 N.E.2d
118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972); Kent v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y.2d 818, 277 N.E.2d 669, 327
N.Y.S.2d 653 (1971); Frank v. McEldowney, 29 N.Y.2d 720, 275 N.E.2d 337, 325 N.Y.S.2d
755 (1971).
" In Safarets, Inc. v. Gannet Co., 80 Misc. 2d 814, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
the court stated:
Were it for us to decide, we would espouse some lesser standard as permitted
in Gertz where private persons are defamed. However, we cannot anticipate
whether the Court of Appeals will abandon the Rosenbloom doctrine or, if it
should, what standard of care it might adopt. Therefore, we are bound to
adhere to the Rosenbloom rule as adopted by the Court of Appeals.
80 Misc. 2d at 818, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
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stated that "the trio was part of a group at a party in Brookwood
Park when they were arrested. Drugs and beer were found at the
party, police charge."4 Chapadeau brought suit in libel claiming
that the article defamed him because it indicated that he was at
a party at which beer and illegal drugs were found. He further
alleged that his reputation as a high school teacher was thereby
injured."
At trial, the supreme court (New York's court of general
jurisdiction) refused to grant the defendant newspaper's motion
for summary judgment. Under the New York procedure which
allows immediate review of such orders,5' the defendant appealed
to the appellate division of the supreme court. That court re-
versed, granting the Observer-Dispatch's motion for summary
judgment. Chapadeau's appeal to the court of appeals followed.
B. The Holding
In an opinion which was surprisingly short, given its poten-
tial impact, the court of appeals first surveyed the relevant cases
in the area, including the New York Times progeny, its own cases
applying Rosenbloom, and finally Gertz. The court then promul-
gated a new rule stating:
We now hold that within the limits imposed by the [United States]
Supreme Court where the content of the article is arguably within
the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably related
to matters warranting public exposition, the party defamed may
recover: however, to warrant such recovery he must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of
information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by re-
sponsible parties."
Applying this new rule to the case, the court determined that the
facts were insufficient to support any finding of "grossly irrespon-
sible" conduct. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment in
favor of the Observer-Dispatch was affirmed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Two DECISIONS
On similar facts, the highest courts of Washington and New
" 38 N.Y.2d at 197, 341 N.E.2d at 570, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (emphasis added).
Brief of Appellant at 2.
s' N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW & R. § 5701 (McKinney 1963).
52 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
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York have created two widely-differing standards for imposing
liability upon media defamers of private individuals involved in
matters of public concern. Since the Gertz opinion authorizes any
standard so long as fault is an element, both standards are consti-
tutionally permissible. The question becomes, therefore, which
standard best serves the competing values of free speech and
untarnished reputation.
Clearly, pragmatic concerns must be taken into account in
formulating an answer. The standard must be easily understood
by the publishers and broadcasters who will be called upon to
comply with it and the members of the bar who must advise
them. In addition, it must be intelligible to the courts which will
adjudicate the disputes which will inevitably arise.
A. The Taskett Negligence Standard
Although the Supreme Court did not mandate any particular
standard in Gertz, the decision makes the Court's preference
abundantly clear. Justice Powell's majority opinion, in dicta,
broadly hints that a negligence test is the preferred "lesser stan-
dard."5
3
The reasons for adopting a negligence standard in determin-
ing media liability in such cases are extremely persuasive. The
tort law concept of negligence is well understood. Courts and
lawyers are familiar with the "reasonably prudent man" test and
its applications. Thus, publishers and broadcasters can be ad-
vised, with considerable certainty, as to what will be expected of
them if they are to avoid liability. The disadvantage, as in all
negligence law, is that application of the standard is subject to
the vagaries of the jury system. Uncertainty always exists as to
how a jury will apply this reasonable man test to the facts of a
given case. Due to this uncertainty, danger of media self-
censorship is unavoidably present. However, this is true of vir-
tually any standard, including the "knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard of truth" test. In addition, the safeguards of the
appellate process, which will prevent findings of liability based
on the expression of unpopular but constitutionally protected
views, are equally available under any legal standard. Thus, the
danger of self-censorship is attributable to the necessary uncer-
" 418 U.S. at 348, 350.
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tainties of a jury system, not to the use of any particular stan-
dard.
In addition, the reasonable man test provides the necessary
protection for constitutional freedoms of speech and press while
allowing recovery for actual damages to reputation. In the ab-
sence of a constitutionally required standard which balances
these interests, it seems reasonable to impose liability on publish-
ers for negligent defamation of private individuals while allowing
for good faith mistakes. It is unlikely that requiring publishers to
act as reasonably prudent members of their profession will re-
strain their exercise of fundamental rights to any significant de-
gree.
The Taskett decision, relying partially on the reasons out-
lined above, also gave great weight to the inability of a private
individual to respond successfully to a defamatory falsehood. 4
Quoting extensively from Gertz, 5 the court noted that a public
official or figure has greater access to the sources of communica-
tion and thus enjoys a greater opportunity to refute defamatory
statements than does a private individual. This, too, is a valid
reason for selecting the negligence standard. The relative defense-
lessness of the private citizen adds weight to the state's interest
in providing a means of redress for injuries to his reputation,
thus, tipping the scale in the balancing process towards a
standard which requires less fault on the part of the publisher
for recovery by the defamed individual.
The majority of states passing on the problem since Gertz
have found this reasoning persuasive."6 Although a trend is diffi-
86 Wash. 2d at 445, 546 P.2d at 85.
Id. at 445-47, 546 P.2d at 84-85.
See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976);
Troman v. Wood, 62 Il. App. 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons,
Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1975).
Other states, while not specifically adopting a negligence standard, seem to suggest
that a negligence standard should in fact be applied. See Helton v. United Press Int'l. 303
So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1974) (private individuals no longer required to prove actual malice to
recover); Tendler v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 788, 118 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1974)
(dicta stating that absent overriding consitutional considerations negligence standard
applies); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 38 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975)
(denying summary judgment against plaintiffs who are private individuals since affidavits
would not preclude some finding of fault).
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cult to discern at present, it is significant that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts has tentatively adopted the negligence stan-
dard.57 The impact this will have upon the states which have not
yet responded to Gertz is unclear. It should be remembered that
several states,58 including Colorado, 9 have chosen to retain the
Rosenbloom standard, maintaining that freedom of speech and
press requires the protection of the stricter "knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard of truth" test. Thus, uniformity in this area
of the law does not seem imminent.
What should ultimately determine which standard the re-
maining states adopt is how well, in practice, each standard pro-
tects the two interests at stake. It is too early to tell how well the
negligence standard will, in practice, protect constitutional free-
doms of speech and press. Nevertheless, a large number of states
have, in rejecting the Rosenbloom test in favor of the negligence
standard, theoretically determined that Rosenbloom offers insuf-
ficient protection to the individual's interest in his reputation.
The choice is, therefore, between a standard that might offer
insufficient protection to constitutional guarantees and the
Rosenbloom standard that, according to the majority of states
ruling on the question, does not give adequate protection to the
value of one's reputation. This failure of the Rosenbloom
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" standard is,
'v RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a
private person, or concerning a public official or a public figure in relation
to a private matter, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) Knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
See AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1974) (2-to-1 decision), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Le Boeuf v.
Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. 1976); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspa-
pers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976).
" Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975) (two
justices dissenting).
For a discussion of the case, see Comment, Constitutional Law-Libel Ac-
tion-Private Plaintiff versus Member News Media-An Application of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.-Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 36 OWo ST. L.J. 911 (1975).
In the recent case of Rowe v. Metz, 564 P.2d 425 (Colo. App. 1977), cert. granted,
No. C-1230 (Colo. May 23, 1977), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the "reckless
disregard" standard of fault was applicable to defamation actions between private indi-
viduals.
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perhaps, the most persuasive argument in favor of the negligence
standard adopted by Taskett.
B. The Chapadeau "Grossly Irresponsible" Standard
Unlike the negligence standard set out in Taskett, the re-
quirement that a private individual must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the publisher acted in a "grossly irre-
sponsible manner" is not a standard familiar to the law." The
court attempted to define the new standard by describing
"grossly irresponsible" as "without due consideration for the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties."'" However, this qualification
results in only further uncertainty in ascertaining what the stan-
dard means. While the term "grossly irresponsible" has the flavor
of recklessness, "without due consideration" and "ordinarily fol-
lowed" are akin to the standards of conduct imposed on profes-
sionals in ordinary negligence. Thus, the initial inquiry must be
to determine where, on the spectrum of standards of care, gross
irresponsibility lies. This is no easy task.
The language employed in Chapadeau seems to rely heavily
upon Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 2
The libel action in Butts was brought by a college football coach
accused of "fixing" a game. The Court, characterizing the plain-
tiff as a "public figure," held: "[A] 'public figure' who is not a
public official may also recover damages for a defamatory false-
hood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct consitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.6 3 Sig-
nificantly, Justice Harlan's test was never applied, and Chief
Justice Warren's concurring opinion applying the New York
Times test to defamation of "public figures" became the law."4
0 No listing for "grossly irresponsible" is found in either BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1968), or WORDS AND PHRASES (1958). "Irresponsible" is defined only with reference to
mental incompetency or insolvency. 22A WORDS AN PHRASES 506 (1958).
11 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
62 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
,3 Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), joined with Butts for argument,
was remanded to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the Warren opinion.
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The Chief Justice's opinion was highly critical of the above stan-
dard:
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion departs from the standard of New York
Times and substitutes in cases involving "public figures" a standard
that is based on "highly unreasonable conduct" and is phrased in
terms of "extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." I cannot
believe that a standard which is based on such an unusual and
uncertain formulation could either guide a jury of laymen or afford
the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to our
society and guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Chief Justice Warren's skepticism is equally applicable to the
Chapadeau standard.
The New York Court of Appeal's choice of this "grossly irre-
sponsible" language is mystifying. Presumably, the court wished
to arrive at a standard stricter than negligence but not as strict
as reckless disregard of truth. The result of this compromise,
however, is an unmanageable standard likely to cause confusion
when applied."
It must be assumed that the court refused to adopt a negli-
gence standard because it felt that such a standard would give
first amendment freedoms inadequate protection. However, in its
apparent concern over these rights, the court has fostered greater
uncertainty as to where constitutional protection ends and liabil-
ity for defamation begins. The result is nothing short of judicial
abdication of responsibility. Not only is such a standard unfath-
omable to a jury of laymen but, more significantly, the publishers
and broadcasters who must abide by the standard will be equally
unsure as to what is expected of them.
This is the major failing of the Chapadeau standard. Clarity
is imperative in this area of the law, as Justice Blackmun recog-
nized in Gertz. 7 Uncertainty is likely to result in self-censorship.
Lowering the standard at the cost of introducing uncertainty ben-
efits neither potential plaintiffs nor defendants. To avoid this
" 388 U.S. at 163.
' But see the following cases where the Chapadeau rule was cited as controlling:
Bolam v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 52 App. Div. 2d 762, 382 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1976); Tobler v.
Newsday, Inc., 51 App. Div. 2d 986, 381 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1976); and Commercial Program-
ming Unlimited v. CBS, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975).
11 Justice Brennan concurred in order to have a "clearly defined majority position
that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity." 418 U.S. at 354.
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self-censorship, the publishers and broadcasters must have at
least a working understanding of what conduct is prohibited and
what conduct is protected. The Chapadeau standard does neither
for the reason that the term "grossly irresponsible" is not a legally
defined standard of conduct. Publishers are likely to avoid report-
ing borderline stories for fear of incurring liability under what
appears to be a standard, the content of which is left largely to
the discretion of courts and juries in application.
The blame does not rest solely with the New York Court of
Appeals. The Chapadeau standard clearly falls within the man-
date of Gertz as laid down by the Supreme Court. Chapadeau
imposes liability only upon a finding of fault, albeit the degree of
fault required remains unclear. The Supreme Court might have
done better simply to give the states a choice between negligence
and the "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" stan-
dards, both of which are thoroughly familiar to bar and bench.
The Court opted to give the states greater leeway, however, open-
ing the way to compromise standards such as Chapadeau.
In spite of its weakness, the Chapadeau standard is not un-
salvageable. A good solid line of cases interpreting the rather
amorphous language of the rule might give it the clarity needed
in this area. It should be remembered that the New York Times
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" test suffered
from the same lack of legal meaning until the words were given
significance through interpretation.68 Unfortunately, while the
standard remains unexplained, New York courts, lawyers, plain-
tiffs, and publishers must suffer with its inadequacies.
CONCLUSION
Given the Gertz decision, wherein the Supreme Court re-
fused to promulgate a standard by which liability in defamation
law could be measured, some confusion is to be expected as each
state attempts to strike a balance between the Constitution and
the individual's right to protection from defamatory falsehoods.
The inevitable outcome is that different standards will be
adopted in different jurisdictions. It therefore seems an inoppor-
tune time for the courts to add further confusion by creating
unmanageable standards.
0 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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Virtually any clear legal standard is preferable to one so
ambiguous as to be no standard at all. The failure to promulgate
a workable and understandable test by which to impose liability
upon defamers of private individuals involved in matters of pub-
lic interest is the near-fatal defect of Chapadeau v. Utica
Observer-Dispatch, Inc.
The remaining question is which, among the workable stan-
dards in this area, is the best. The negligence standard adopted
in Taskett v. KING Broadcasting, Inc. strikes an admirable bal-
ance between the interest in constitutionally protected free
speech and press, and the interest in protection of the reputations
of private individuals. The standard adequately protects both
interests by limiting media liability to occasions when the pub-
lisher or broadcaster has failed to act reasonably and, at the same
time, allows the private individual to recover actual damages,
without the almost insurmountable burden of proof required by
Rosenbloom. It seems likely that, given these advantages, the
states which have yet to set a standard in this area should opt for
the negligence standard as did the court in Taskett.
Herbert C. Phillips
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